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Abstract
Message deducibility and static equivalence are central problems in symbolic security protocol
analysis. We present Fast, an efficient decision procedure for these problems under subterm-
convergent equational theories. Fast is a C++ implementation of an improved version of the
algorithm presented in our previous work [10]. This algorithm has a better asymptotic complexity
than other algorithms implemented by existing tools for the same task, and Fast’s optimizations
further improve these complexity results.
We describe here the main ideas of our implementation and compare its performance with
competing tools. The results show that our implementation is significantly faster: for many
examples, Fast terminates in under a second, whereas other tools take several minutes.
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1 Introduction
Cryptographic protocols are widely used to provide secure network communication. It is
therefore important that such protocols are proven correct. Automated tools for this task
rely on symbolic protocol models, in which cryptographic primitives are modeled as function
symbols and messages exchanged over the network are represented by terms in a term algebra.
Properties of cryptographic primitives are represented as equational theories relating terms
in the term algebra.
Message deducibility and static equivalence are two important problems in the analysis
of security protocols. The deducibility problem consists of deciding whether an attacker can
use a set of messages (for instance, the messages exchanged over a network) to compute a
secret message. The knowledge of an attacker is often expressed in terms of deducibility,
i.e., the set of messages he can deduce, and most automated methods for protocol analysis
rely on this notion [5, 4]. Static equivalence is used to model the notion that an attacker
cannot distinguish between two sequences of messages [3]. It has been used to model several
indistinguishability related security properties, including security against off-line guessing
attacks [12, 6, 2] and anonymity in e-voting protocols [13].
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We present an implementation of the algorithm proposed in [10] for efficiently deciding
deduction and static equivalence. Although existing tools [7, 9] solve these problems for more
general equational theories, our algorithm has significantly better asymptotic complexity for
the class of subterm-convergent equational theories. This class is general enough to model
many equational theories relevant in practice. Fast implements several optimizations to
the algorithm presented in [10], further improving our asymptotic complexity results. We
have analyzed its performance using as benchmarks different practically relevant examples of
subterm-convergent theories. As expected, the results show that Fast is significantly faster
than other algorithms for the equational theories it handles.
In Section 2 we formally introduce the notions of message deducibility and static equiv-
alence. In Section 3 we describe our implementation and the improvements we made to
the algorithm given in [10]. In Section 4 we present our benchmark tests and compare the
performance of Fast with existing tools. We draw conclusions in Section 5.
2 Background and decision problems
We consider signatures Σ =
⊎
n∈N Σn consisting of finitely many function symbols, where Σi
contains the functions symbols of arity i. We also fix countably infinite, disjoint sets Var and
Name of variables and names.
Given a set X, T (Σ, X) is the set of Σ-terms over X, i.e., the smallest set such that
X ⊆ T (Σ, X) and f(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ T (Σ, X) for all t1, . . . , tn ∈ T (Σ, X) and all f ∈ Σn. Given
t ∈ T (Σ, X), we define the set sub(t) of subterms of t as usual: if t ∈ X, then sub(t) = {t}; if
t = f(t1, . . . , tn) for some f ∈ Σn and t1, . . . , tn ∈ T (Σ, X), then sub(t) = {t} ∪
⋃n
i=1 sub(ti).
We denote by vars(t) = sub(t)∩Var the set of variables occurring in t. The size |t| of a term
t ∈ T (Σ, X) is given by |t| = 1 if t ∈ X and |t| = 1 +∑ni=1 |ti| if t = f(t1, . . . , tn).
We use the standard notion of substitution as a partial function σ : Var9 T (Σ, X) with
a finite domain. We abuse notation by using the same symbol σ for a substitution and its
natural (homomorphic) extension to T (Σ, X), where dom(σ) ⊆ X. We write tσ instead of
σ(t).
A frame is a pair (n˜, σ), written υn˜.σ, where n˜ ⊆ Name is a finite set of names and
σ : Var9 T (Σ,Name) is a substitution with a finite domain. The size |φ| of a frame φ is given
by |φ| = ∑x∈dom(σ) |xσ|. Given a frame φ = υn˜.σ, we define Tφ = T (Σ, (Name\ n˜)∪dom(σ)).
We say that terms in Tφ are φ-recipes. A term t can be constructed from φ if there is a
φ-recipe t′ such that tσ = t′ (syntactically). Frames are used to represent an attacker’s
knowledge: the names in n˜ represent randomly generated nonces unknown to the attacker,
and the terms in σ’s range represent the messages learned by the attacker, for instance, the
messages exchanged over a network.
A rewrite rule is a pair (l, r), written as l→ r, where l, r ∈ T (Σ,Var). A rewriting system
R over Σ is a set of rewrite rules. We always assume that rewrite systems are finite. Given a
rewriting system R, we define the relation →R ⊆ T (Σ,Name)× T (Σ,Name) as the smallest
relation such that:
if (l→ r) ∈ R and σ : vars(l)→ T (Σ,Name) is a substitution, then lσ →R rσ, and
if t1, . . . , tn, t′i ∈ T (Σ,Name), ti →R t′i, and f ∈ Σn, then f(t1, . . . , ti, . . . , tn) →R
f(t1, . . . , t′i, . . . , tn).
If the rewriting system →R is convergent, then each term t has a unique normal form
t↓R ∈ T (Σ,Name). In this case, we define ≈R ⊆ T (Σ,Name)× T (Σ,Name) as the equational
theory such that t ≈R t′ if and only if t↓R= t′↓R. As usual, we write t ≈R t′ instead of
(t, t′)∈ ≈R.
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A rewriting system R is subterm convergent if→R is convergent and, for each (l→ r) ∈ R,
r ∈ sub(l). It is weakly subterm convergent if, for each (l → r) ∈ R, either r ∈ sub(l) or
r ∈ T (Σ, ∅) is in normal form.
Deducibility and static equivalence
I Definition 2.1. Given a frame φ = υn˜.σ, a term t ∈ T (Σ,Name), and a rewriting system
R, we say that t is deducible from φ under R, and write φ `R t, if there is a φ-recipe t′ such
that t′σ ≈R t.
I Definition 2.2. Given two frames φ = υn˜.σ and φ′ = υn˜′.σ′ and a rewriting system R,
we say that φ and φ′ are statically equivalent under R, and write φ ≈sR φ′, if Tφ = Tφ′ (i.e.,
n˜ = n˜′ and dom(σ) = dom(σ′)) and, for all t, t′ ∈ Tφ, tσ ≈R t′σ if and only if tσ′ ≈R t′σ′.
The message deducibility problem is concerned with whether an attacker who has learned
the messages represented by the terms in the range of σ can use those messages to compute
(deduce) a secret message t without using the (secret) names in n˜. Static equivalence
formalizes that two sequences of messages are indistinguishable from an attacker’s point of
view. This is modeled as the condition that there are no two recipes that yield (equationally)
equal terms under the substitution σ but not under σ′ (or vice-versa). This is useful, for
instance, in modeling off-line guessing attacks [12, 10].
3 Fast algorithm
Fast is a C++ implementation of the algorithm described in [10]. It solves the message
deducibility and static equivalence problems for weakly subterm-convergent rewriting systems.
Such rewriting systems are sufficiently expressive to represent a standard Dolev-Yao equational
theory with one-way functions, pairing, projections and symmetric and asymmetric encryption
and decryption. They can also model idempotent functions and signature schemes, among
others.
Other existing tools for solving these two decision problem are Yapa [7], Kiss [9], and
ProVerif [8]. However, ProVerif is designed for solving the harder problem of protocol security
under active adversaries. Therefore, it is not surprising that it performs significantly slower
for these two problems. Moreover, ProVerif is not guaranteed to terminate even under
subterm-convergent equational theories, and Yapa claims a performance between one and
two orders of magnitude faster than ProVerif [7]. We thus compare our algorithm with Yapa
and Kiss.
Compared to Yapa and Kiss, Fast has a better asymptotic complexity, but a narrower
application scope. For instance, Yapa and Kiss can handle rewriting systems representing
blind signatures and homomorphic encryption. Kiss can also handle trapdoor committments.
Fast cannot handle these rewriting systems. We believe, however, that many of the techniques
and results that allow Fast to achieve a better asymptotic complexity do not depend on the
subterm-convergent hypothesis (cf. Section 5).
3.1 Procedures and complexity
Data structures
Fast represents terms as DAGs (Directed Acyclic Graphs). Each term is represented by a
C++ object which we call a term vertex. Term vertices contain as a class member a C++
object representing a recipe, which we will call a recipe vertex. Furthermore, each recipe
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vertex contains as a class member an array of term vertices. These term vertices represent
the normal forms of the terms corresponding to the recipe in each of the input frames. These
normal forms are computed whenever a recipe vertex is created. Whenever a recipe is added
to a vertex v, all the parent vertices of v are checked; if all children of a parent vertex pv
have recipes, then a new recipe is computed and added to pv.
Saturation procedure
Similar to Yapa and Kiss, Fast relies on a frame saturation procedure. However, Fast’s
saturation procedure generates less terms and is therefore more efficient than these other
procedures. Namely, Fast only adds to the saturated frame those terms that are instances
of right-hand sides of rules (rather than all deducible subterms). Furthermore, Fast only
instantiates a rule if there is some subterm of the left-hand side that is mapped to a term
already in the frame and each variable is mapped to either a subterm of a term in the original
frame or a fresh nonce. A more detailed description of the saturation procedure, as well as a
comparison with the procedures used in other tools, is given in [11].
Given a frame φ = υn˜.σ, Fast’s saturation procedure computes two sets Γs and Γl of
term vertices. Γs represents a set of subterms in the range of σ that are deducible from
φ. Γl represents the set of instantiations lσl of left-hand sides l of rewrite rules such that
σl : vars(l) → sub(ran(σ)) ∪ Υ, where Υ is a finite set of fresh nonces computed from the
rewrite system, and there is some s ∈ sub(l) such that sσl ∈ Γs.
Γs is initialized as ran(σ). Recipes are added to each vertex representing a term in ran(σ)
and to each leaf vertex. The program then tries to create instances lσl of left-hand sides
of rules which verify the conditions above. To do this, for each t ∈ Γs, each rewrite rule
l→ r, and each s ∈ sub(l), Fast checks whether t and s can be unified, and then attempts
to extend the substitution unifying these terms to all the variables in l.
Whenever such an instance is found, the term vertices needed to represent that instance
are created, and the term vertex representing lσl is added to Γl. When a recipe ζ is added
to a term vertex in Γl representing one such instance lσl, if rσl does not have a recipe yet,
then the recipe ζ is added to rσl, and rσl is added to Γs. rσl can then be used to find more
instances of left-hand sides of rules.
Deducibility and static equivalence
After obtaining the saturated frame φs, deciding whether a term is deducible from φ amounts
to deciding whether it can be constructed from the terms represented by term vertices in Γs.
From Γs and Γl one also obtains a finite set Eqφ of equations between φ-recipes satisfied by
φ and such that, if another frame φ′ with Tφ = Tφ′ satisfies all equations in Eqφ, then φ′
satisfies all equations satisfied by φ. These sets of equations are the same as those tested
by the algorithm described in [10]. Therefore, given frames φ and φ′ such that Tφ = Tφ′ ,
one can decide whether φ ≈sR φ′ by building the corresponding saturated frames, obtaining
the sets of equations Eqφ and Eqφ′ described above, and then testing whether φ satisfies all
equations in Eqφ′ and vice-versa.
Improvements over [10]
Our implementation improves the algorithm described in [10] in several ways. The most
relevant improvement is that Fast only considers instances lσl of left-hand sides of rules
if there is some s ∈ sub(l) such that sσl is in the range of σs. This makes the saturation
procedure faster and also reduces the number of equations that the algorithm must check
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to decide static equivalence. Another important improvement is that recipes are computed
at most once for each vertex. Furthermore, whenever a new recipe t ∈ Tφ is added, the
implementation creates a recipe object containing pointers to the vertices (tσ)↓ and (tσ′)↓.
The proof of correctness of the algorithm presented in [10] shows that one must only consider
instances lσl of left-hand sides of rules if rσl is in normal form; therefore, this only requires
matching the term resulting from the recipe with each left-hand side of a rule, discarding it
if the term obtained after one step of rewriting is not in normal form. This can be done in
constant time.
3.2 Asymptotic complexity
The above improvements reduce the asymptotic complexity of the algorithm for some
equational theories. For instance, consider the rewriting system
DYasym =
{
pi1(〈x, y〉)→ x, pi2(〈x, y〉)→ y,
{
{x}y
}−1
y
→ x,
{
{x}ypub
}−1
ypriv
→ x
}
used in [10] for comparing the asymptotic complexity of the algorithm introduced there
with Yapa and Kiss. The asymptotic complexity of Kiss is estimated in [10] to be O(|φ|7)
under DYasym. For this rewrite system, Yapa has exponential complexity in the worst case
scenario, since it does not implement DAG representation of terms. Even if DAGs were
implemented, the asymptotic complexity of Yapa’s saturation procedure is estimated (again
in [10]) to be O(|φ|7). The asymptotic complexity of the algorithm presented in [10] for this
rewrite system is estimated to be O((|φ|+ |φ′|)3 log2(|φ|+ |φ′|) for static equivalence. Given
that each recipe is associated with the normal forms of the terms represented by the recipe
in each frame (thus eliminating the overhead of computing normal forms), Fast’s complexity
for static equivalence under DYasym is only O((|t|+ |φ|)2 log2(|t|+ |φ|)). A detailed analysis
of Fast’s asymptotic complexity is given in [11].
4 Performance analysis
We have considered several families of interesting and practically relevant examples to
compare the performance of our algorithm with Yapa and Kiss. The results show great
disparities in the performance of the three algorithms. Neither Kiss nor Yapa show a
clear advantage over the other: depending on the example, either algorithm may perform
significantly faster than the other. As expected from the complexity results, Fast generally
performs much better than either of these algorithms, particularly for static equivalence.
Even for artificial equational theories designed to produce worst case performance for our
algorithm, Fast is still more efficient for static equivalence, sometimes significantly so. For
message deducibility under such equational theories, Fast performs better in most examples;
however, in a few, it appears to be slower by a small constant.
All our tests were performed on a computer with an Intel Core 2 Duo processor running
at 2.53GHz and with 4Gb memory. In all our static equivalence tests, we consider two equal
frames. Similarly, in all our deduction tests, the input term is a secret that does not occur in
the range of the substitution of the input frame. Therefore, the result is positive in all static
equivalence tests and negative in all deducibility tests. This does not affect the algorithm’s
performance significantly, as both frames still have to be saturated in all implementations —
that is, deducible subterms must still be added to the saturation, and the sets of equations
which must be tested to check for static equivalence must still be generated (cf. Section 3).
Static equivalence takes a slightly longer time in this case because all equations must be
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checked rather than stopping as soon as a counter-example is found. However, the difference
is minor. We present here an illustrative sample of the tests performed. For a more complete
report on our results, see [1].
4.1 Chained keys
This family of tests uses the signature ΣDY , with ΣDY1 = {pi1, pi2} and ΣDY = {{·}· , {·}−1· ,
〈·, ·〉}, and a rewriting system representing a standard Dolev-Yao intruder without asymmetric
encryption, specified by the set of rewrite rules
DY =
{
pi1(〈x, y〉)→ x, pi2(〈x, y〉)→ y,
{
{x}y
}−1
y
→ x
}
.
For n ∈ N, we define the frame φckn = υn˜ckn .σckn , where n˜ckn = {k, k0, . . . , kn} and σ ={
x1 7→ {k0}k1 , . . . , xn 7→ {kn−1}kn , xn+1 7→ kn
}
. For each parameter n, the deduction prob-
lem is to decide whether φckn `DY k, and the static equivalence problem is to decide whether
φckn ≈sDY φckn .
Fast has a much better performance than both Yapa and Kiss for these examples. Yapa
also performs much better than Kiss. Tables 1 and 2 illustrate these relationships.
Table 1 Performance on chained keys for deduction (time in ms)
Parameter 50 100 200 500 1000 2000 5000
Fast 11 20 40 143 224 474 1526
Kiss 259 1730 12655 288606 > 300000 > 300000 > 300000
Yapa 31 108 415 4624 11297 62457 > 300000
Table 2 Performance on chained keys for static equivalence (time in ms)
Parameter 50 100 200 500 750 1500 2500
Fast 20 41 88 247 424 1020 1546
Kiss 1341 12185 127828 > 300000 > 300000 > 300000 > 300000
Yapa 143 744 5516 18467 44451 197648 > 300000
4.2 Composed keys
This family of examples uses the same signature ΣDY and the same rewriting system DY
used in Section 4.1.
For n, s, i ∈ N, define tin,s recursively by
t0n,s = {〈k2s−1, k2s−2〉}〈k2s,ks2+1〉 ,
tin,s =
{〈ti−1n,s 〈k2s+1+2i(n−1), k2s+2i(n−1)〉, 〉}〈k2s+2+2i(n−1),k2s+3+2i(n−1)〉.
For k > 0, the frame φck = υn˜cn.σcn is such that n˜cn = {k, k0, . . . , k2n2+1} and σcn ={
x1 7→ tn−1n,1 , . . . , xn 7→ tn−1n,n , xn+1 7→ k2n2 , xn+2 7→ k2n2+1
}
. The deduction problem corre-
sponding to parameter n considered in our tests is to decide whether φcn `DY k. The static
equivalence problem corresponding to parameter n is to decide whether φcn ≈sDY φcn.
This family of examples is particularly challenging because the decryption keys are pairs
of secrets. At each point of the algorithm’s execution, decrypting the right message yields
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a pair of previously unknown secrets. This pair may then be used to compose the next
decryption key by exchanging the order of the terms in the pair. As illustrated in Tables 3
and 4, the difference in Fast’s performance is particularly marked in this example. Kiss
also performs much better than Yapa.
Table 3 Performance on composed for deduction (time in ms)
Parameter 3 4 5 7 9 10 20
Fast 7 11 17 34 61 126 945
Kiss 138 867 3760 46369 245207 > 300000 > 300000
Yapa 158 34118 > 300000 > 300000 > 300000 > 300000 > 300000
Table 4 Performance on composed for static equivalence (time in ms)
Parameter 3 4 5 6 8 10 20
Fast 12 21 28 48 92 148 1635
Kiss 469 2625 10428 252000 > 300000 > 300000 > 300000
Yapa 936 157358 > 300000 > 300000 > 300000 > 300000 > 300000
4.3 Denning-Sacco shared key protocol
The Denning-Sacco symmetric key protocol [14] is used to establish session keys in a network
with a single server and multiple agents. Each agent shares a (secret) symmetric key with
the server, but there are no shared keys between agents. In Alice&Bob notation, the protocol
is as follows.
1. A→ S : A,B
2. S→ A : {A,KA,B, T, {KA,B,A, T}KS,B}KS,A
3. A→ B : {KA,B,A, T}KS,B
Here, A and B are two participants, and S is the server. A requests from the server a session
key to communicate with B. The server generates a new session key, KA,B, and sends it
to A, encrypted with the (symmetric) key shared between A and S. This message also
contains a timestamp T , used to determine the validity of the new session key, and the ticket
{KA,B,A, T}KS,B . A then forwards this ticket to B, who can decrypt it using the key KS,B
shared between B and S, to obtain the new session key KA,B, the name A of the intended
communication partner, and the time T of the request.
This example uses the result of executing multiple sessions of the Denning-Sacco protocol.
For the parameter n we assume a network with 3n participants, each of which initiates one
session with each other participant. We assume that one third of the shared keys between
the server and the agents are compromised, i.e., available to the attacker.
We will once again use the signature ΣDY and the rewriting system DY from Section 4.1.
For parameter n, we thus use the frame φdsn = n˜dsn .σdsn , with σdsn = σ1n ∪ σ2n ∪ σ3n ∪ σ4n, where
σ1n =
{
x1i 7→ KS,i | i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
}
;
σ2n =
{
x2i,j 7→ 〈Ai,Aj〉 | i, j ∈ {1, . . . , 3n} , i 6= j
}
;
σ3n =
{
x3i,j 7→
{
〈Aj , 〈Ki,j , 〈Ti,j , {〈Ki,j , 〈Ai, Ti,j〉〉}KS,j 〉〉〉
}
KS,i
| i, j ∈ {1, . . . , 3n} , i 6= j
}
;
σ4n =
{
x4i,j 7→ {〈Ki,j , 〈Ai, Ti,j〉〉}KS,j | i, j ∈ {1, . . . , 3n} , i 6= j
}
,
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and n˜dsn = {Ki,j , Ti,j ,KS,i | i, j ∈ {1, . . . , 3n}}.
Here, σ1n represents the keys compromised by the attacker and σ2n, σ3n, and σ4n represent
the messages exchanged as part of the execution of the first, second, and third steps of the
protocol, respectively. The deduction problem is to decide whether φdsn `DY KS,3n and the
static equivalence problem is to decide whether φdsn ≈sDY φdsn .
Yapa performs noticeably better than Kiss in this example. Fast, as before, is signifi-
cantly faster than both. The results are shown in Tables 5 and 6.
Table 5 Performance on Denning-Sacco for deduction (time in ms)
Parameter 5 7 9 11 12 14 24
Fast 337 768 1336 2588 2239 5083 20073
Kiss 6637 30195 91743 232093 > 300000 > 300000 > 300000
Yapa 2409 10320 30732 68845 74298 172249 > 300000
Table 6 Performance on Denning-Sacco for static equivalence (time in ms)
Parameter 3 5 7 9 11 13 20
Fast 181 585 1281 2300 6598 7507 24614
Kiss 1219 8543 34726 158717 > 300000 > 300000 > 300000
Yapa 446 2836 12300 52506 134391 269781 > 300000
4.4 Fast worst case
In this family of examples, for the parameter n, we use the signature Σwc, where Σwc1 = {f}
and Σwcn = {h}. The rewriting system is given by the set wcn = {h(f(x1), . . . , f(xn))→ x1}.
We define the frame φwcn = n˜wcn .σwcn , where n˜wcn = {k, k1, . . . , kn} and σwcn = {x1 7→ f(k1),
. . . , xn 7→ f(kn)}. The deduction problem is to decide whether φwcn `wcn k and the static
equivalence problem is to decide whether φwcn ≈swcn φwcn .
This example is challenging because, to saturate this frame, Fast must instantiate each
element of the tuple with each of the secret names. Therefore, the asymptotic complexity of
Fast for this family is O(nn). Note that this does not contradict the fact that, for a given
rewriting system, Fast has polynomial-time complexity; the exponential complexity results
from the fact that the size of the rewriting system itself increases with the parameter n.
Table 7 Performance on worst case for deduction (time in ms)
Parameter 3 4 5 6
Fast 9 72 1192 32487
Kiss 10 47 866 21446
Yapa 11 161 6607 > 300000
None of the existing algorithms perform well on this example: Fast’s performance is
comparable to that of Kiss and Yapa performs significantly worse. This is illustrated in
Tables 7 and 8.
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Table 8 Performance on worst case for static equivalence (time in ms)
Parameter 3 4 5 6
Fast 15 142 2199 56312
Kiss 16 146 2125 69533
Yapa 16 297 8862 > 300000
Nonlinear terms
It is interesting to note that Fast’s complexity depends chiefly on the number of different vari-
ables in the rewriting system. Therefore, it’s performance is not significantly affected if the left-
hand sides of rewrite rules are non-linear. This is not the case for the other algorithms, whose
performance degrades when the complexity of the terms in the rewriting system increases,
even when the number of variables remains the same. Tables 9 and 10 illustrate this point.
Here, the rewriting system considered is wc2n = {h(f(x1), f(x1), . . . , f(xn), f(xn))→ x1}.
The frames and problems considered here are the same as above.
Table 9 Performance on worst case 2 for deduction (time in ms)
Parameter 2 3 4 5 6
Fast 7 9 148 1567 43282
Kiss 9 99 4381 183236 > 300000
Yapa 45 > 300000 > 300000 > 300000 > 300000
Table 10 Performance on worst case 2 for static equivalence (time in ms)
Parameter 2 3 4 5 6
Fast 4 17 396 6197 47937
Kiss 10 292 16135 > 300000 > 300000
Yapa 56 > 300000 > 300000 > 300000 > 300000
5 Discussion and future work
Fast is an efficient algorithm for deciding deduction and static equivalence under weakly
subterm-convergent rewriting systems. The implementation and our benchmarks are available
for download at [1]. Fast’s scope is narrower than that of other existing tools for these
problems, but is broad enough to represent many practically relevant theories. As expected
from the results in [10], Fast is significantly faster than both Yapa and Kiss in almost
all our tests. Even for the articial examples designed to degrade its performance, Fast
still compares favorably to other algorithms: it is either faster, or slower by only a small
constant. This constitutes a significant advantage since the problematic cases for Yapa and
Kiss degrade these algorithms’ performances dramatically.
We believe that many of the ideas and results that allow Fast to achieve better asymptotic
results may still be valid with weaker hypotheses on the rewriting system. Therefore, extending
the algorithm to handle more general equational theories without significantly degrading its
performance is an important research goal.
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